Información sobre Riesgo de Mercado por los Mayores Bancos Mundiales: Evidencia sobre la Diversidad en la Elaboración de Información Financiera e Implicaciones para la Armonización Contable e Internacional. by Woods, Margaret et al.
MARKET RISK REPORTING BY THE WORLD’S TOP BANKS:
EVIDENCE ON THE DIVERSITY OF REPORTING PRACTICE
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL
ACCOUNTING HARMONISATION
INFORMACIÓN SOBRE RIESGO DE MERCADO POR LOS MAYORES BANCOS MUNDIALES:
EVIDENCIA SOBRE LA DIVERSIDAD EN LA ELABORACIÓN DE INFORMACIÓN
FINANCIERA E IMPLICACIONES PARA LA ARMONIZACIÓN CONTABLE INTERNACIONAL
ABSTRACT
The increasing adoption of international accounting standards and global convergence of
accounting regulations is frequently heralded as serving to reduce diversity in financial
reporting practice.  In a process said to be driven in large part by the interests of
international business and global financial markets, one might expect the greatest degree
of convergence to be found amongst the world’s largest multinational financial corporations. 
This paper challenges such claims and presumptions.  Its content analysis of longitudinal data
for the period 2000-2006 reveals substantial, on going diversity in the market risk disclosure
practices, both numerical and narrative, of the world’s top-25 banks. The significance of such
findings is reinforced by the sheer scale of the banking sector’s risk exposures that have been
subsequently revealed in the current global financial crisis.  The variations in disclosure
practices documented in the paper apply both across and within national boundaries, leading
to a firm conclusion that, at least in terms of market risk reporting, progress towards
international harmonisation remains rather more apparent than real. 
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RESUMEN
La adopción de las normas internacionales de contabilidad y la convergencia global de la
regulación contable, se exhibe frecuentemente como forma de reducir la diversidad en la
elaboración de información financiera. Dado que este proceso parece inducido en gran
medida por los intereses de las corporaciones internacionales y de los mercados
financieros globales, cabría esperar que las mayores corporaciones financieras
multinacionales presentaran un gran  nivel de convergencia.
En este trabajo se aborda este tema de investigación. El análisis de datos longitudinales
correspondientes al periodo 2000-2006, de los 25 mayores bancos del mundo, revela que
todavía existe una diversidad sustancial en relación a las prácticas de divulgación de
riesgo de mercado, tanto en su cálculo numérico como en su forma narrativa. La
importancia de los resultados está subrayada por la ilimitada escala de exposición al
riesgo por parte del sector bancario que ha quedado al descubierto en la actual crisis
financiera global. Las  prácticas sobre divulgación financiera documentadas en el trabajo
presentan grandes divergencias no sólo entre distintos países sino también entre distintos
bancos de un mismo país, por lo que puede alcanzarse la firme conclusión de que, al
menos en términos de información sobre riesgo de mercado, el progreso hacia la
armonización internacional sigue siendo más aparente que real.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Normas internacionales de contabilidad; regulación contable;
riesgo de mercado.
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INTRODUCTION
“The rationale for a global standard, rather than the Babel of competing and sometimes
contradictory national standards, has been often stated. But it is so important that it bears
repeating. Global accounting standards would improve investor confidence in the market,
so long as the standards are high-quality, comprehensive and rigorously applied. They’d
allow investors to draw better comparisons among investment options. They’d also lower
costs for issuers, who would no longer have to incur the cost of preparing financial
statements using different sets of accounting standards. And those lower costs would
benefit the company’s shareholders, who ultimately bear the burden of the entire cost of
the financial reporting system.”
(Chairman’s Address to the SEC Roundtable on International Financial Reporting
Standards by Chairman Christopher Cox, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Washington, D.C. March 6, 2007)
“The ‘best and the brightest’ at our top investment banks have expended great energy
designing ludicrously complex financial products, which you need a Nobel Prize in physics to
understand. Whilst financial innovation and securitisation have brought real benefits and
allowed for risk dispersion through the system, it has come at a cost. Product complexity has
introduced increased opacity into our financial system, making it almost impossible to
determine where risk lies and making it much more difficult to achieve financial stability.”
(John McFall MP, Chairman of the House of Commons Treasury Committee, commenting
on the Committee’s report, Financial Stability and Transparency, 6th report of Session
2007/08, see
http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/treasury_committee/tc0708pn30.cfm)
Historic differences in accounting practice around the world have been well documented
and analysed by accounting researchers. There is extensive literature on both the
classification of accounting systems (e.g., Gray, 1988; Doupnik and Salter, 1993; Nobes
1998) and the analysis of variations in accounting principles and disclosure practices
(e.g., Walton, 1992; Meek et al., 1995; Choi and Levich, 1996; Gray et al., 1995).
However, in the light of regulatory initiatives encouraging international harmonisation of
accounting and a convergence of thinking between national regulatory bodies, there are
evident grounds for claiming that such diversities of practice are disappearing.
In May 2000, the acceptance by IOSCO of the IASC’s1 core set of standards as a basis for
cross border listings opened the door to global harmonisation. That same year, the European
1
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(1) The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was the predecessor of the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB).  For a detailed history of the IASC, see Camfferman and Zeff, 2007).
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Commission imposed a requirement that from January 2005 exchange-listed companies in
all member countries should prepare consolidated accounts according to Commission-
endorsed IFRSs. To date, over one hundred countries have either already adopted IFRS,
aligned their national standards to IFRS, or have committed themselves to doing so in the
foreseeable future.  Frits Bolkestein, commissioner in charge of the European Commission’s
Internal Market, described the European agreement as a move that signalled “a new era of
transparency and the end of a Tower of Babel in financial reporting in Europe” (Blanchet,
2002).  Such European developments still left fundamental differences between the
accounting practices within IFRS and US GAAP.  These differences meant that all non-US
firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ were required to file returns with
the  SEC and provide both income and equity reconciliations to US GAAP.  This essentially
meant that the global financial reporting environment could effectively be divided into four
main groupings, incorporating companies reporting under either: IFRS; IFRS with an
accompanying reconciliation to US GAAP; US GAAP; or applying national accounting rules
that differed from both IFRS and US GAAP.
Subsequent efforts to eradicate international differences have included a growing number
of countries committing, albeit in varying degrees, to the IFRS roadmap (notably,
including countries such as China and South Korea).  Developments to reduce the
difference between IFRS and US GAAP have included: the joint IASB/FASB
Memorandum of Understanding arising out of the Norwalk Agreement (2002) and, more
recently, the November 2007 decision by the SEC to eliminate the above mentioned US
GAAP reconciliation requirement for foreign private issuers of financial statements
prepared in accordance with IFRS as issued by the IASB (with one, time-limited exception
for issuers using the European Commission’s IAS 39 ‘carve out’).  Finally, the publication
of a SEC Concepts Release on whether to allow US issuers to prepare their financial
statements using IFRS (as published in English by the IASB) rather than US GAAP has
made the strongest signals to date that the former is destined to become the world standard
in global corporate financial reporting.   In a speech (1 February, 2008)  to the European-
American Business Council, Christopher Cox, the Chairman of the SEC, emphasized that
such developments reflected “the great progress that the International Accounting
Standards Board has made in developing IFRS as a single, high-quality accounting
standard that is implemented consistently in multiple jurisdictions around the world.  This
year, the Commission will consider how we will map the future for U.S. firms and
International Financial Reporting Standards. But one thing is certain: the expanded use of
a single, high-quality accounting standard will eventually empower investors to make
better informed investment decisions by giving them information that is more easily
comparable” (see http://www.iasplus.com/usa/sec/0802coxifrs.pdf). 
While the pace of regulatory action is certainly quickening with respect to the pursuit of
accounting convergence, research studies, however, continue to show that a truly
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harmonized framework for useful financial reporting currently remains more of an
objective than a current reality (for reviews, see Callao et al., 2007; Ball, 2006).  In a
recent survey of senior UK finance executives on the impact of the introduction of IFRS in
Europe, the conclusion was reached that “there remains significant doubt about the
benefits to individual companies and the information available to the capital markets”
(PwC, 2007, p.2). Two thirds of PwC survey respondents indicated that they did not believe
that the introduction of IFRS had resulted in better information in the marketplace.  In
contrast, an ICAEW (2007) on-line survey of EU investors, preparers and auditors found
that 63% of investor respondents thought that IFRS had improved the quality of
consolidated financial statements against 24% who thought that IFRS had made it worse
(p. 25).2 However, 49% of investors thought that the switch to IFRS accounting had made
financial statements more difficult to understand, although 32% disagreed – while a
number of participants at a series of roundtable events felt that it was too early to judge
whether the migration to IFRS had been a success (ICAEW, 2007, p. 26).3
What all of this standard setting and regulatory development means for the user of
financial statements is a significant and ongoing research agenda. Not withstanding the
current regulatory commitments to convergence, are financial reports becoming more
comparable across international boundaries?  How easy is it for analysts to compare the
information provided across different financial reporting regimes? For instance, do
companies reporting under US GAAP provide more or different types of information to
those reporting under IFRS? The role of financial reporting in serving user needs and
aiding decision usefulness is embedded in the conceptual frameworks of all the major
accounting regulators, and often used to justify the inclusion of specific regulatory
requirements. However, as Young (2006) has argued, the user generally referred to by
standard setters is a conceptual construction and the standard setting process tends not to
encompass significant direct user involvement, nor reflect the interests of a wide
stakeholder base of potential users. Such work presents significant legitimacy challenges
to the work of international standard setting bodies, some of which have been very visible
in recent years with concerns expressed over the pursuit of fair value accounting and
revised standards on segmental reporting. Indeed, the uncertainties associated with the
pursuit of a new global accounting language are well illustrated by the recent joint
statement by the largest international accounting firms, through the Global Public Policy
Committee (GPPC), providing interpretations as to how auditors should treat certain
stipulations of IFRS in the context of today’s challenging economic and financial
environment (see GPPC, 2007)4.
Market risk reporting by the world’s top banks
(2) The corresponding figures for preparers were 60% and 14% respectively (80% and 8% for auditors).  A
number of participants at a subsequent roundtable event felt that it was too early to judge whether the
migration to IFRS had been a success (ICAEW, 2007, p. 26).
(3) It is worth pointing out that it was certain specific accounting policies (such as those for financial
instruments) which caused most confusion (ICAEW, 2007, p. 25).
(4) Similar minded guidance on auditing issues in difficult financial market conditions has also been provided
by the UK’s Auditing Practices Board (see APB, 2008) and by the US based Centre for Audit Quality (see
CAQ, 2007).
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This paper makes a timely contribution to heightened interests in, and concerns over, the
quality of global financial reporting by examining the market risk disclosures of
multinational banks over the period 2000-2006 and assessing the extent to which the de
jure moves towards harmonization and convergence over this period have been
accompanied by an equivalent de facto harmonization in financial reporting practice.
Market risk disclosures by the world’s largest banks were chosen as the focus for this study
for several reasons. First, despite claims that banks have been at the forefront of
developments in risk management, the banking sector is under-researched in terms of risk
disclosures in corporate annual reports (for a review of the existing literature and some
exploratory empirical work, see Linsley et al., 2006)5. Secondly, the complexities of the
financial accounting practices of banks appear mainly to have stimulated surveys of the
extent to which their annual reports collectively comply with the requirements of
(international) accounting standards (see ICAEW, 2007, pp. 141-146; E&Y, 2006; PwC,
2006) or studies focused on singular market risk disclosure items (such as Value at Risk
(VaR) measures – see Perignon and Smith, 2007; Perignon et al., 2008).  Limitations of the
former are that they represent broad-based surveys that struggle to go much beyond the
listing of differences between standard and actual reporting practice6. The latter type of
studies, in contrast, can be restrictively specific. For instance, even though Perignon and
Smith found that VaR disclosures varied widely across a sample of US commercial banks
over the period 1996-2005, VaR information only represents just one element of a much
wider set of market risk disclosures made by banks in their annual reports.  
This paper seeks to draw on the strengths (and avoid the weaknesses) of both types of
studies by addressing the broad range of market risk7 disclosures (rather than just one
measure of risk) and considering this reporting from an international, comparative
perspective (rather than a one country perspective)
In studying patterns and variations in market risk reporting practices across the world’s
leading banks, it is important to emphasise that such organizations are involved in a wide
M. Woods, K. Dowd and C. Humphrey
(5) Much of the work on risk disclosures in the 1990s centred on debates and discussions regarding desired,
rather than actual, forms of disclosure – particularly, regarding the capacity to incorporate risk disclosures
within a specific section or separate part of a company’s annual report and the extent to which risk
information should be forward looking rather than based solely on historical information (see Linsley et al,
2006, pp. 269-270; ICAEW, 1998; 1999; 2002; Schrand and Elliott, 1998; BCBS, 1998).  There has also been
a tendency for the focus to be on the risk disclosure practices of non-financial companies rather than banks
per se – see Abraham and Cox, 2007; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Dobler, 2008; Linsley and Shrives, 2006).  
(6) This compliance orientation can engender a rather conservative form of analysis which either lists
differences in practices without considering their overall significance or somewhat underplays their potential
significance.  An interesting case in point is Ernst and Young’s (2006) survey which found wide differences
in market risk disclosures but concluded in the executive summary of the report that “(a)nother example of
the challenge for consistency is the reporting of market risk sensitivities, where the use of different methods
and criteria - no doubt appropriate to the banks concerned - leave the reader with a range of sensitivities that
are difficult to compare (p. 7, emphasis added).  The strength of such ‘no doubt appropriate’ conclusions and
assumptions can be weakened significantly by subsequent events – for instance, the E&Y (2006) report chose
to highlight the ‘helpful’ nature of the disclosures in the 2005 annual report of Société Genéralé on the
limitations of VaR (p. 57)!
(7) Market risk is commonly defined as the exposure to an adverse change in the market value of portfolios
and financial instruments caused by changes in market prices or rates. Such risk typically arises through the
buying and selling of financial instruments that are sensitive to market risk.
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range of activities that extend beyond the traditional commercial banking activities of
deposit and loan provision. While such (additional) activities vary somewhat across
institutions, they can broadly be divided into securities trading and the provision of
other retail and corporate services. The diversity of income sources is reflected in the
banks’ financial statements and it is noticeable that, for many banks, a growing proportion
of total income is earned through trading activities which potentially give rise to
substantial market risk, in addition to that already related to traditional bank lending
activities. The need for more research in the area of market risk reporting by banks has
also been vividly highlighted by the current ‘credit crunch’.  Collective bank exposures to
market risk is quite breath-taking. In October 2008 the Bank of England estimated that
global mark-to- market losses across US dollar, Sterling and Euro currency areas
amounted to around US$2.8 trillion or £1.8 trillion (Bank of England, 2008).  The financial
crisis has certainly served to emphasize the extent of global economic interdependence
resulting from the activities of financial institutions and the desire of banking supervisors,
creditors, customers and investors to have access to information that facilitates an
understanding of the risks being faced by financial institutions8.  
With market risk disclosures being required under both US GAAP and IFRS but with the
prescribed content of disclosures differing between jurisdictions, it presents an obvious
opportunity to investigate and compare the impact of discretion upon the information
available to users across regulatory regimes.  Additionally, it is possible to study the
potential impact of discretionary interpretation of IFRS upon the comparability of reports
within IFRS ‘compliant’ jurisdictions.  There has been, and continues to be, much debate
over the extent to which IFRS represents one global standard or, given the scope for
discretion over levels of disclosure, a global standard with multiple national variants
(especially given the absence of detailed implementation guidance - e.g., see Schipper,
2005). Our research offers some insights into the extent to which detailed reporting practice
might vary even under the same set of regulations, and even within the same country.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. In the next section we review the
regulatory context within which the research is conducted. This is followed by a section
that details the research methodology, including the data, research instrument deployed
and methods used in analyzing the results. Section four reports the main results of the
paper, while the final section concludes the analysis and assesses the main implications
of the research undertaken.
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(8) It is worth noting that the inclusion of specific disclosure requirements under Pillar 3 of the revised
capital adequacy framework (Basel Committee, 2004), commonly referred to as Basel II and set to take effect
from 2008, illustrate the ‘pre-credit crunch’ recognition by a global regulator of the importance of ensuring
that the market is kept informed about a bank’s exposure to risk.  Similarly, transcripts of the evidence
presented to the House of Commons Treasury Committee by the Chief Executive and other staff from the
Financial Services Authority (the UK banking regulator) show the core role played by the regulator in risk
monitoring (see http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/536/536ev.pdf).
Some empirical studies of bank reporting disclosures have concluded that disclosures related to risk
management practices seem to be most influential in explaining cross-sectional variation in the cost of equity
capital (see Poshakwale and Courtis, 2005, p. 441).
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REGULATORY CONTEXT
The regulatory framework for financial and non financial reporting by banks is complex
because regulations are formulated by a range of different bodies, including the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) or Basel Committee, the International Accounting
Standards Board, national banking supervisors and local accounting standards boards. The
regulations define the content/style of both reporting to the national supervisory bodies
(such as the FSA in the UK) as well as the broader mix of capital market participants.
Institutions that operate at a global level have to comply with multiple jurisdictional
requirements. 
At a global level, the basic reporting rules are laid down by the Basel Committee, whose
1998 publication, “Enhancing Bank Transparency”, was aimed at encouraging banks across
the world to disclose ‘timely’ and ‘reliable’ information on a range of issues, including their
risk management practice and risk exposure. Six years later, when the final framework for
Pillar 3 of the revised capital adequacy accord (Basel II) was published, the Committee had
converted this encouragement of disclosure into very specific reporting requirements that
became effective from 2008 onwards. All banks seeking to comply with Basel II must report
both qualitative and quantitative details in respect of their capital structure, capital
adequacy, and different types of risk exposure including credit, market, operational,
equities and interest rate risk (Basel Committee, 2006).  The underlying argument for such
disclosures is that “transparent risk information is potentially of great use to stakeholders”
(Crockett, 2002, p.1). It is also useful to note that the Basel II disclosure requirements
encompass both numerical and narrative elements, while certain academic research studies
have highlighted the emphasis placed on narrative disclosures by both private investors
(Bartlett and Chandler, 1997) and analysts (Breton and Taffler, 2001).  
The move towards the global regulation of risk disclosures by banks needs to be seen in
the context of more than a decade of efforts by both national and international accounting
and/or government regulators to improve reporting practice in this area. For example, in
the USA the Financial Accounting Standard Board’s publication of Financial Accounting
Standard (FAS) No. 119, “Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair
Value of Financial Instruments”, in 1994 was a direct response to calls for improved
disclosure of information on institutional exposure to market risk sensitive financial
instruments. FAS 119 was subject to criticism however because the disclosures continued
to fail to provide users of the financial statements with the information required to identify
a company’s net market risk exposures. As a result, the SEC took its first steps towards
further improvements in disclosure practice (Linsmeier and Pearson, 1997) via the
introduction of new qualitative and quantitative reporting requirements in Financial
Reporting Release No. 48 (SEC, 1997).  Nonetheless, initial evidence on the impact of
FRR 48, suggested that whilst market risk disclosures were improved, there remained
2
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scope for further improvement (Roulstone, 1999). At this point, US hopes were pinned
upon FAS 133 (FASB, 1998) on accounting for derivatives and financial instruments,
which came into delayed effect in June 2000. Between 2000 and 2006 there were no
further refinements to the US risk reporting regulations.
The IASC, published its first rules on qualitative and quantitative disclosures in relation
to the risks associated with the use of financial instruments in International Accounting
Standard (IAS) 32 (IASC, 1995). The risks identified by IAS 32 included market, credit,
liquidity and interest rate risks. IAS 32 was applicable to all types of businesses that used
financial instruments but a complementary standard, IAS 30, established more detailed
disclosure requirements for banks and financial institutions. The period 1995-2000 was a
very active one for the IASC as they sought to generate a core set of standards in time for
compliance with the 2000 deadline set by the agreement with IOSCO. IAS 30 was
amended by IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement) with effect from
January 2001. Subsequently, with effect from January 2005, the December 2003 version
of IAS 39 shifted the risk disclosure requirements across to IAS 32, but this change ran
simultaneously with the IASB’s pursuit of a programme of updating the content of IAS 30.
In 2004 the board published an exposure draft – ED 7 – on financial instruments
disclosures which evolved into IFRS 7 in 2005. Interestingly, and in line with US
regulations, IFRS 7 does not set separate rules for disclosures by banks or financial
institutions; furthermore, its implementation, for accounting periods commencing after 1st
January 2007, also saw the disappearance of disclosure requirements from IAS 32. 
The above review of regulatory activity in relation to risk reporting indicates that the
period 2000-06, the focal point for this study, is one of international variation but also
evolution. While the year 2000 marked a starting point for stability in US reporting
requirements, within the broader international arena the IASB spent the years 2000-2006
working simultaneously on changes to disclosure, recognition and measurement issues in
respect of financial instruments. The net result is an environment in which there is
considerable research scope in terms of considering international developments (and
variations) in the market risk reporting practices of the world’s leading banks.  
In this paper, we address this developing reporting environment by focusing on three
specific questions. First, are market risk disclosure levels linked to bank size? Secondly,
have such disclosures by banks increased over the period 2000-06? Lastly, within this
context, has international diversity of risk reporting practice reduced over this time?
Collectively, these questions enable consideration to be given to the status and impact of
market risk reporting initiatives and related accounting standards. For instance, an
assessment can be made of any linkage between sector leadership and levels of disclosure
and whether banks with the largest market capitalisations disclose more. Similarly, it is
possible to consider whether disclosure levels are generally rising over time and the form
Market risk reporting by the world’s top banks
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of differences in reporting practices both within and across countries. Or, in more
technical terms, to assess whether the rate of de facto harmonisation is lagging behind the
rate of de jure harmonization.
Higher levels of market risk disclosure can be expected to be linked to the overall length
of the annual report but this also raises questions about the potential for information
overload on the part of the user/reader.  While many standard setting and regulatory
initiatives both pre- and post-credit crunch have been premised on the pursuit of (and
residing belief in) transparency, there are some clear indications that increasing levels of
disclosure and explicit commitments to transparency in themselves are not necessarily
sufficient.  As Jon Moulton, a leading private equity chief, recently emphasized (in giving
evidence to the UK’s House of Commons Treasury Committee), there is much to question
about the current state of bank annual financial reports: 
“All I am trying to do here is demonstrate to you the incredible complexity of what is
going on here. You would not believe that this stuff is out there but it is out there, it is
in the fine print and the mountains of paper that these industries produce. Here is
what we have got, we have got an interconnected, mind-blowingly complicated market
where losses are not just limited to actual economic losses, there are economic losses
arising because of the amplifying effects of the inter connectedness,the loss of
confidence and fear. It is very hard indeed to estimate what a $5 billion loss in sub-
prime really means to the financial markets. It might be $50 billion of losses, the
complexity has no limit. However, there is no doubt that both the regulators’ and
directors’ skills in these entities are limited. You have interviewed people who did not
know what a CDO was and you have interviewed people who do not understand how
this lot fits together at all. I do not think you are ever going to get to a situation where
boards of directors and regulators can handle this level of complexity in an effective
way. Transparency does not do it. If you look at an HSBC set of accounts, famously 400
and something pages last month and the Royal Mail would not carry it for health and
safety reasons, they are unreadable. Northern Rock was a master of disclosure.
Everything about Northern Rock is available on its website still. You can find all the
details, their off balance sheets, their guarantees, but how you are supposed to
interpret a 400 page document on one of the guarantees, with 11 layers of debt,
interest rate swaps, currency swaps done in three currencies, I do not know.
Transparency will not do it. Disclosure does not get you to the answer because nobody
understands it or follows it.”
(Jon Moulton, Managing Director, Alchemy Partners, giving oral evidence before the
House of Commons Treasury Committee, 13th May, 2008; see
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/uc536-
ii/uc53602.htm)
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While being very sensitive to the relationship between levels/forms of disclosure and the
understandability of bank annual reports, the research task and results documented in this
paper focus primarily on the extent of market risk disclosures and the nature and scale of
differences across the banking sector.   Such empirical positioning was seen to be an
important first step in moving debate beyond both the anecdotal and any polemical
tendencies encouraged by today’s global financial crisis.  That said, the results obtained
and the process by which the data used for the study was collected provide some pertinent
insights and reflections on the general informativeness of market risk disclosures in the
banking sector.  
RESEARCH APPROACH 
We began our empirical study with the lists of banks identified by The Banker as the “Top
25” in the world. The Banker produces a number of different lists of the “Top 25”, based
upon a range of alternative ranking criteria, including total assets, Tier 1 capital, and
market capitalization. The “Top 25” varies according to the ranking criteria selected so
that, for example, only 19 of the “Top 25” defined in terms of  total assets also appear in
the “Top 25” ranked by market capitalization.  This study utilizes the “Top 25” ranked by
market capitalization as we believe that market capitalization is a more natural measure of
bank size than any of the alternatives.9
As might be expected, the banks appearing in the “Top 25” by market capitalization, and
their individual rankings, both change over time. Comparing the “Top 25” at the start
(2000), mid (2003) and end (2006) points of our study reveals a number of clear trends in
the composition of the list. Firstly, the table is dominated by US and UK banks.
Additionally, there is consistency in relation to the top three banks, namely Citigroup,
HSBC and Bank of America. Individual rankings in the remainder of the table are,
however, more volatile over time.  Table 1 summarises the geographic composition of the
“Top 25” over the same time frame, revealing a number of changes in the geographic mix.
3
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(8) In earlier research on market risk disclosure practice by international commercial banks, Perignon and
Smith (2007) use total assets as the criteria for size ranking. We consider this approach to be flawed because
it uses the “raw” accounting figures, which are subject to potential bias as a result of variations in accounting
practice across institutions and the differential effects of the use of fair versus historic values for particular
asset classes. In addition, there is no intuitive reason why a bank that owns more assets will necessarily be
motivated to disclose more information about market risk, particularly if those assets are not market related.
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Most noticeably, between 2000 and 2003 a total of five Japanese banks are demoted from
the list and replaced by banks from Australia, Canada, and mainland Europe. Between
2003 and 2006 three US banks fall out of the table, and three Japanese banks reappear.
2006 also marks the entry of a Chinese bank in the tables, following privatization of some
of the country’s largest institutions. Explanation and discussion of the causes of these
shifts in both the banks and their respective rankings in the tables is beyond the scope of
this paper, but it is worth noting that these changes may have implications for international
comparison of financial reporting practice in the sector. 
Table 2 identifies the “Top 25” as at July 2003, mid-way through our period of study, and
is used as the initial framework for analysis.
In order to meet our requirement to analyse only those market risk disclosures relating to
trading activities two US banks, Wells Fargo and Fifth Third Bancorp, were eliminated
from our sample of twenty five: neither bank engages in any significant level of trading
activity, so both are irrelevant to our study. Of the twenty three used in the analysis,
eighteen are listed on the NYSE, one on NASDAQ, and the remainder on at least one other
international stock exchange (e.g., such as Paris, Tokyo or London) as well as on their own
domestic stock market. Thus, the sample banks are all major multinational entities
characterized by multiple listings, and hence might be expected to display more
homogenized and perhaps more advanced reporting practices than smaller institutions. 
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TABLE 1.- GEOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION (BY NUMBER) OF THE TOP 25 BANKS 
BY MARKET CAPITALISATION, 2000 -2006
Country 2000 2003 2006
USA 8 9 6
UK 3 5 5
Switzerland 2 2 2
France 1 2 3
Germany 3 1 1
Spain 2 2 2
Netherlands 1 1 0
Italy 0 1 1
Australia 0 1 0
Canada 0 1 1
Japan 5 0 3
China 0 0 1
Source: The Banker, July 2000, 2003 and 2006
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In deciding where to look for market risk disclosures, we recognize that there are a range of
tools and routes used by companies to disclose information to the markets. That said, academic
researchers continue to identify the annual report as the primary communications device
(Botosan, 1997; Knutson, 1992). On this basis, therefore, all of the data used in the following
analysis is drawn from the sample companies’ annual reports.  The only exception to this
procedure is the case of Union Bank of Switzerland, which is unique in disclosing almost all of
the risk related information in a handbook which is published separately from the annual
report. The handbook was therefore also utilized in the disclosure analysis for UBS. 
Market risk reporting by the world’s top banks
TABLE 2.- THE TOP 25 BANKS BY MARKET CAPITALISATION, 2003
Position Bank Country Market cap ($m)
1 Citigroup USA 233,939
2 HSBC Holdings UK 133,205
3 Bank of America USA 119,678
4 Wells Fargo & Co USA 86,770
5 Royal Bank of Scotland UK 86,472
6 JP Morgan Chase & Co USA 73,023
7 UBS Switzerland 72,760
8 Wachovia Corp USA 58,055
9 Barclays Bank UK 51,503
10 HBOS UK 51,041
11 BNP Paribas France 48,711
12 US Bancorp USA 47,801
13 Bank One Corp USA 45,385
14 SCH Spain 44,946
15 Deutsche Bank Germany 43,242
16 Lloyds TSB Group UK 42,838
17 BBVA Spain 35,731
18 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland 35,376
19 Fifth Third Bancorp USA 34,449
20 National Australia Bank Australia 34,116
21 ABN Amro Bank Netherlands 32,810
22 FleetBoston Financial Corp USA 32,397
23 Unicredito Italiano Italy 30,351
24 Societe Generale France 29,734
25 Royal Bank of Canada Canada 29,597
Source: The Banker and Thomson Datastream
All figures to June 16, 2003.  *not in 2002’s list of Top 25
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In order to understand how disclosures may be evolving over time, reports were analysed
for each of the years 2000, 2003 and 2006. Leaving three year gaps allows greater scope
for the identification of step changes in reporting practice. In particular, it enables us to
consider the impact of staged, but significant, developments in IFRS accounting
regulations within the chosen topic area10 against a backdrop of unchanging US regulation. 
Documenting the Disclosure of Market Risks 
Content analysis was used as the framework to identify and analyse the disclosure
practices of each bank.  Critical to such a research method is the definition of the unit of
analysis.  Milne and Adler (1999) suggest that sentences are the most reliable unit, but
this approach is only valid in cases where purely narrative text is being studied. Unerman
(2000) described narrative analysis as being only partial content analysis because
information may also be provided in the form of graphs, tables etc. His view was re-iterated
by Beattie and Thompson (2007) who called for future studies to consider a range of
communication methods that extend beyond pure narrative.
The regulations on risk reporting prescribe minimal requirements in both qualitative and
quantitative terms, and so risk disclosures commonly take the form of a mix of narrative,
tabular, numerical and graphical data. Consequently, the use of sentences as the unit of
analysis in this context would have been incomplete and we, therefore, defined the unit of
analysis as being information provided in narrative, tabular, graphical or numerical format.
An illustration of the different categories of disclosure is helpful and these are provided
below from the 2003 annual report of Citigroup, which is ranked as the world’s largest bank. 
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(8) In 2000 and 2003 the Europe-wide agreement on IFRS implementation had not come into effect, and so
the majority, but not all, large banks reported in accordance with national GAAP. For those choosing to adopt
IFRS, the disclosure rules relevant to this paper are found within IAS 30. For financial reports for the year
2000, the 1994 version of the standard was applicable. A revised version was applicable from 1st January
2001 but this remained irrelevant to those using national GAAP. The first broad application of the revised
standard would have been in 2005 with European harmonisation. In order to retain equal blocks of time
across our analysis period, we opted to look at 2006 annual reports rather than those from 2005. Interestingly,
IAS 30 has now been replaced by IFRS7 with effect from 2007 – offering the scope for further study of the
relative impact of changes in IFRS.
NARRATIVE
Price risk in trading portfolios is measured through a complementary set of tools, including factor sensitivities, value-
at-risk, and stress testing. Each trading portfolio has its own market risk limit framework, encompassing these measures
and other controls, including permitted product lists and a new product approval process for complex products,
established by the business and approved by independent market risk management.
Factor sensitivities are defined as the change in the value of a position for a defined change in a market risk factor (e.g.,
the change in the value of a Treasury bill for a 1 basis point change in interest rates). It is the responsibility of
independent market risk management to ensure that factor sensitivities are calculated, monitored and, in most cases,
limited, for all relevant risks taken in a trading portfolio.
Source: Citigroup Annual Report 2003, p. 83
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Having chosen to consider market risk disclosures of narrative, tabular/numerical and/or
graphical forms, the next task was to decide on an appropriate classification system so as
to gain an overall appreciation of the scale and patterns of disclosure.  We opted for the
construction of a score sheet. This was done by manual extraction of information on market
risk for trading activities drawn from the annual reports of all the sample banks for the
years 2000, 2003 and 2006.  The score sheet was designed by reviewing the categories of
information on market risk disclosed by the sampled banks The identified information
categories covered all aspects of market risk management including trading instruments,
levels of trading activity, sizes of trading positions, scenario modeling, VaR analysis and
validation procedures.  
In all, a total of 41 potential disclosures were identified, and these are listed in Table 3,
which provides an illustrative example of a completed score sheet for HSBC (2003). HSBC
had one of the highest levels of disclosures in all of the three years considered, obtaining
Market risk reporting by the world’s top banks
TABULAR/NUMERICAL
The following table summarizes Value-at-Risk in the trading portfolios 
as of December 31, 2003 and 2002, along with the averages:
Dec. 31, Dec. 31, Dec. 31, Dec. 31,
In millions of dollars 2003 Average 2002 Average
Interest rate $83 $79 $75 $54
Foreign exchange 14 21 25 16
Equity 17 15 12 18
Commodity 13 8 5 13
Covariance adjustment (44) (43) (34) (35)
Total $83 $80 $83 $66
Source: Citigroup Annual Report 2003, p.84
Source: Citigroup Annual Report 2003, p.83
Revenue (in millions of dollars)
GRAPHICAL
Histogram of Daily Trading-Related Revenue-Twelve Months Ended December 31, 2003
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a score of 36 (out of 41) in each of 2000 and 2003 and 34 in 2006. This level of score
indicates a bank with a high and quite consistent level of disclosure.
M. Woods, K. Dowd and C. Humphrey
TABLE 3.- RISK DISCLOSURE SCORE SHEET FOR HSBC BANK: 2000, 2003 AND 2006
Type of Disclosure 2000 2003 2006
Market risk definition 1 1 1
Types of instruments traded 1 1 1
Risk control structure 1 1 1
VaR definition 1 1 1
* Model type 1 1 1
* Confidence limit 1 1 1
* Holding period 1 1 1
* Time frame of data 1 1 1
* Assumptions re independence of risk types 1 1 1
Limitations of VaR 1 1 1
Limitations of alternative risk measurement systems 1 1 1
Stress testing 1 1 1
Stress results 0 0 0
Trading VaR – overall position 1 1 1
* Minimum VaR 1 1 1
* Maximum VaR 1 1 1
* Average VaR 1 1 1
VaR by instrument or risk type 1 1 1
* Minimum VaR 1 1 1
* Maximum VaR 1 1 1
* Average VaR 1 1 1
Average daily trading revenues/profit – overall position 1 1 1
Standard deviation of trading revenues/profit 1 1 1
Number  of loss making trading days 1 1 1
Most frequent daily trading result 1 1 1
Lowest daily revenue/profit 0 0 1
Highest daily revenue/profit 1 1 1
FX trades average daily revenue/profit 1 1 0
Interest rate trades average daily revenue/profit 1 1 0
Equity trades average daily revenue/profit 1 1 0
Trading profit – overall position 1 1 0
* by instrument type 1 1 0
Histogram of trading revenues/profit 1 1 1
Tail losses shown clearly and completely 1 1 1
Balance sheet value of market traded assets 1 1 1
Balance sheet value or market traded liabilities 1 1 1
* by instrument type 1 1 1
Net cash inflow from trading 1 1 1
Back-testing systems: general description 0 0 1
Back-testing systems: details of models used 0 0 0
Histogram/plot of VaR levels for trading activity 0 0 1
Total Disclosure Score ( Max. 41) 36 36 34
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The ex-ante list of potential disclosures was then used to apply a binary coding system to
the reports for each of the sample 23 banks for the years 2000, 2003 and 200611. A bank
was given a score of 1 if the information was reported and a score of 0 if it was not. This
simple weighting system is in line with the approach adopted by other researchers in the
field (Robins and Austin, 1986; Wallace et al., 1994).  It was also felt to be consistent with
our principal research aims in this paper – namely, to provide some much needed
indication of trends and variations in the scale of market risk disclosures in the banking
sector.  In this respect, its usage reflects Marston and Shrives’ (1991) observation that a
disclosure score provides a measure of the extent, but not of the quality, of disclosures.  
The score sheet was completed by a coder reading the full contents of the annual reports.
Scoring validity was then tested using coder reliability checks which involved the blind
repetition of the coding process by another of the researchers. The full content of the
banks’ annual reports was examined because an earlier study (Woods and Marginson,
2004) has shown that risk disclosures are widely scattered across the annual report, with
qualitative information commonly reported in the financial review, but supplemented by
quantitative data in the relevant notes to the accounts. Additionally, important market risk
related information, such as dealing revenue/profits/assets/liabilities are included in the
core financial statements. The need to look at the full report in order to locate all relevant
risk disclosures is very time consuming for the researcher, but also indicates the
difficulties faced by any stakeholder who wishes to identify a bank’s overall risk exposure.
As a random example of the level of effort required for such an analysis, the 2006 annual
report of the Dutch bank ABN Amro contained market risk disclosures on each of the
following pages: 77, 78, 100, 152, 200, 211 and 212. 
Having calculated our disclosure scores for each bank, we focused on three different
aspects of disclosure practice:
- The relationship between disclosure and bank size.
- Changes in disclosure practices over time.
- Institutional and international variations in disclosure practice.
RESULTS
Disclosure and Size
Table 2 shows that the sample institutions vary considerably in their size. The smallest of
the twenty five banks, the Royal Bank of Canada, has a market capitalization (as at 2003)
4
Market risk reporting by the world’s top banks
(11) For the sake of consistency, we analyse the disclosures for a common set of 23 banks based upon the 2003
market capitalisation rankings. As a result the sample size reduces to 21 in 2006 because Bank One is absorbed
into JPMorgan Chase in the intervening period, and similarly Fleet Boston is merged with Bank of America.
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of just below US$30bn, whilst the largest, Citigroup, is worth in excess of $234bn. On this
basis, it is appropriate to assess and evaluate the strength, if any, of any relationship
between the bank size and disclosure scores.
Roberts et al. (1998) observe that “there is general support for the proposition that disclosure
levels increase as companies get larger.” This suggests that we might expect to see a positive
relationship between disclosure scores and bank size. To examine this issue further, we
estimated the Spearman rank correlation coefficient for disclosure scores and bank size rankings
for each of the three years, and results are reported in Table 4.  None of the correlations were
statistically significant at a conventional significance level of 5%, leaving us to conclude that
there is no significant or stable correlation between disclosure levels and institution size.12
M. Woods, K. Dowd and C. Humphrey
(12) The lack of any statistically significant relationship between disclosure and bank size may be due to the
fact that, even though there are large differences in the size of the institutions within the sample, the absolute
size of even the smallest of the banks is still very large. The results obtained may indicate that there is a
threshold level of market capitalisation that can usefully be used to define a “large” company, and that for
banks above that level (such as those in our sample), there is no particular correlation between size and
disclosure. Further research is required, however, to test the validity of this hypothesis.
TABLE 4.- MARKET CAPITALIZATION VERSUS DISCLOSURE RANKINGS FOR 2000, 2003 AND 2006
Bank 2003 2000 2003 2006
Market Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure
cap ranking ranking ranking ranking
Citigroup 1 14 11 3
HSBC 2 1 1 8
Bank of America 3 2 1 4
Royal Bank of Scotland 5 7 8 4
JP Morgan Chase 6 =3 1 2
UBS 7 =7 4 18
Wachovia 8 13 16 11
Barclays 9 9 11 8
HBOS 10 =17 17 17
BNP Paribas 11 =14 17 21
US Bancorp 12 22 23 19
Bank One Corp 13 =20 20 n/a
SCH 14 =5 5 20
Deutsche Bank 15 =3 5 4
Lloyds TSB 16 19 15 15
BBVA 17 =17 17 14
Credit Suisse Group 18 16 8 8
National Australia Bank 20 =20 20 13
ABN Amro 21 =5 7 16
FleetBoston Financial Corp. 22 =11 13 n/a
Unicredito Italiano 23 23 22 12
Societe Generale 24 =11 13 1
Royal Bank of Canada 25 10 8 4
Spearman’s rank correlation 0.196 0.288 -0.120
t-test statistic 0.691 1.378 -0.482
P-value of hypothesis of zero correlation 25.1% 9.13% 31.8%
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These findings are supported by a more casual examination of the relative rankings of each
bank, as shown in Table 4 for year 2003. For example, the world’s largest bank, Citigroup,
was ranked only fourteenth in terms of its disclosure practices in 2000 and eleventh in
2003. Only in 2006 does its disclosure score more closely correlate with its size.
Conversely, ABN Amro, which is placed twenty-first in terms of size, was ranked much
higher - fifth (2000), seventh (2003) and then sixteenth (2006) - by the level of its risk
disclosures. Similarly, the Royal Bank of Canada ranks bottom by size, but ranks as high
as tenth (2000), eighth (2003) and fourth (2006) for its disclosure practice.
Changes in Disclosure Practice over Time
We turn now to the issue of how levels of disclosure might be changing over time. We
alluded already to the fact that the bulk of disclosures in market risk reporting are
voluntary in nature, and in recent years there has been increasing support for voluntary
rather than mandatory reporting in a number of areas of accounting. For example, an
FASB (2001) report suggested that companies can achieve benefits in the capital
markets from increased levels of voluntary disclosure, implying that voluntary
disclosures might be in firms’ own interests. Schrand and Elliott (1998), however, argued
that there is little empirical evidence of the link between the cost of capital and risk
disclosures and consequently there is little incentive for voluntary disclosures.
Furthermore, it can also be argued that where disclosure is voluntary, then managers
may be tempted to delay or manipulate the reporting of bad news – although see
Schleicher et al. (2007, p. 169-170) for a discussion of the difficulties in identifying
cause-effect relationships in voluntary disclosures. 
Table 5 shows the disclosure scores for each bank over each of the three years of analysis.
The mean disclosure score is 22.4 in 2000, 26.4 for 2003 and 27.9 for 2006. Thus, average
disclosure levels show a mildly increasing trend over both the period 2000-2003 and
2003-2006. The ratio of the mean to the standard deviation indicates that the improvement
is more marked over the earlier years, but, possibly of more significance, is the fact that
the mean disguises a number of very clear and dramatic shifts in disclosure practice
amongst a number of individual banks.
There are, for example, clear exceptions to the general rule of rising scores, as six banks
reduce the extent of their disclosure levels between 2003 and 2006. The most notable
reductions are those of SCH and BNP Paribas, at minus 26 and minus 23 points
respectively, but UBS and ABN Amro also exhibit the same trend. Most interestingly, the
one common feature across all four of these banks is that they switched from reporting
under local GAAP to using IFRS during the relevant period. 
Market risk reporting by the world’s top banks
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At one level this might be interpreted as an indication that IFRS reduces the market risk
information available to shareholders but this is probably over-simplistic. An alternative
and perhaps more credible explanation is that the banks have taken risk information out
of their annual report and are now providing it elsewhere. We sought to investigate further
what was happening by checking the position in relation to the most extreme case of BNP
M. Woods, K. Dowd and C. Humphrey
TABLE 5.- BANK DISCLOSURE SCORES, 2000-2006
Disclosure score in: Change in disclosure score over:
Bank 2000 2003 2006 2000/3 2003/6
Citigroup 21 27 36 6 9
HSBC 36 36 34 0 -2
Bank of America 31 36 35 5 -1
Royal Bank of Scotland 27 28 35 1 7
JP Morgan Chase 29 36 37 7 1
UBS 27 34 22 7 -12
Wachovia 22 24 31 2 7
Barclays 25 27 34 2 7
HBOS 19 23 23 4 0
BNP Paribas 21 23 0 2 -23
US Bankcorp 8 8 12 0 4
Bank One Corp 16 22 6
SCH 28 31 5 3 -26
Deutsche Bank 29 31 35 2 4
Lloyds TSB 18 25 26 7 1
BBVA 19 23 28 4 5
Credit Suisse Group 20 28 34 8 6
National Australia Bank 16 22 29 6 7
ABN Amro 28 30 24 2 -6
FleetBoston Financial Corp. 23 26 3
Unicredito Italiano 6 13 30 7 17
Societe Generale 23 26 41 3 15
Royal Bank of Canada 24 28 35 4 7
Mean 22.4 26.4 27.9 4.0 1.3
Std 7.0 6.7 10.7 2.4 10.7
Min 6 8 0 0 -26
Max 36 36 41 8 17
Range 30 28 41 8 43
n 23 23 21 23 21
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Paribas which, as Table 6 shows, scores zero for its market risk disclosures in 2006. We
checked the French statutory filings for BNP Paribas, together with all of the 2006 reports
posted on the bank’s website, but were still unable to find any market risk disclosures
reported there. Even questions to a senior “Big Four” auditor in France failed to provide
us with an explanation for the omission of even the most basic required disclosures. The
reason for BNP Paribas’ “zero disclosure” therefore remains a mystery which also raises
significant questions about the enforcement of IFRS rules.
There is one other result in Table 5 which warrants individual comment, and that is the
case of Société Genéralé, which achieved a ‘perfect’ score of 41 in 2006. This score is
especially revealing in the light of the recent events at the bank, where the activities of
a ‘rogue trader’ generated direct losses of around €5 billion and left its reputation for risk
management reportedly “in tatters” (Lex Column, FT, 2008). This result, in itself,
emphasizes just how important it is for research to study further what is being provided
in the name of market risk disclosures.  It certainly emphasizes the dangers of assuming
that high levels of disclosure go hand-in-hand with the existence of effective risk
management systems.
Table 5 also reports the standard deviations of disclosure levels in each year (respectively,
7.0, 6.7 and 10.7 for each of 2000, 2003 and 2006). These confirm that there is a fair
amount of disparity in disclosure practices across different banks but that the degree of
disparity is showing no clear tendency to diminish. We also see from Table 5 that banks
can be classified into the following groups:
- Banks that have consistently high levels of disclosure (e.g., HSBC, Deutsche, ABN Amro).
- Banks whose disclosure levels are consistently average (e.g., HBOS, Lloyds TSB, NAB)
- Banks that have consistently low levels of disclosure (e.g., US BankCorp, BankOne).
- Banks that have improved strongly in their disclosure levels (e.g., Wachovia,
Unicredito, Royal Bank of Canada, Société Genéralé).
In order to try and explain why a bank may fall into one or other of the above categories,
we compared the disclosure scores against the regulatory regime governing their financial
reporting and also the length of the annual report. Within any single regulatory context, a
degree of consistency might be expected in the extent of disclosure across institutions –
such that they tend to remain one specific disclosure category.  However, as shown below,
our findings indicate that this is not the case. Additionally, the overall length of the annual
report could be used as a simple proxy for disclosure policy, with a longer report being
indicative of a greater willingness to include voluntary as well as statutory disclosures. 
Market risk reporting by the world’s top banks
1_market_risk  20/1/09  10:17  Página 29
30 M. Woods, K. Dowd and C. Humphrey
H
SB
C
C
on
si
st
en
t h
ig
h 
pe
rf
or
m
er
20
00
U
K
 G
A
A
P*
20
00
 
25
1
1.
51
1.
38
16
6
20
00
20
03
U
K
 G
A
A
P*
20
03
38
4
1.
70
22
6
20
03
20
06
IF
R
S*
20
06
45
8
1.
69
27
1
20
06
D
eu
ts
ch
e 
B
an
k
C
on
si
st
en
t h
ig
h 
pe
rf
or
m
er
20
00
U
S 
G
A
A
P
20
00
37
3
2.
25
20
03
U
S 
G
A
A
P
20
03
33
7
1.
49
20
06
U
S 
G
A
A
P
20
06
30
8
1.
14
A
B
N
 A
m
ro
C
on
si
st
en
t h
ig
h 
pe
rf
or
m
er
20
00
D
ut
ch
 G
A
A
P*
 
20
00
13
2
0.
80
20
03
D
ut
ch
 G
A
A
P*
20
03
18
0
0.
80
20
06
IF
R
S*
20
06
27
0
1.
00
H
B
O
S
C
on
si
st
en
tly
 a
ve
ra
ge
20
00
U
K
 G
A
A
P
20
00
10
4
0.
63
0.
76
20
03
U
K
 G
A
A
P
20
03
12
4
0.
55
20
06
IF
R
S
20
06
19
6
0.
72
Ll
oy
ds
 T
SB
C
on
si
st
en
tly
 a
ve
ra
ge
20
00
U
K
 G
A
A
P 
20
00
79
0.
48
20
03
U
K
 G
A
A
P
20
03
18
8
0.
83
20
06
IF
R
S
20
06
13
3
0.
49
N
at
io
na
l 
C
on
si
st
en
tly
 a
ve
ra
ge
20
00
A
us
t. 
G
A
A
P*
 
20
00
18
0
1.
09
A
us
tr
al
ia
 B
an
k
20
03
A
us
t.G
A
A
P*
20
03
22
0
0.
97
20
06
A
IF
R
S
20
06
29
2
1.
08
TA
B
L
E
 6
.-
 D
IS
C
L
O
SU
R
E
 C
A
T
E
G
O
R
IE
S 
A
N
D
 A
N
N
U
A
L
 R
E
P
O
R
T
 L
E
N
G
T
H
B
an
k
C
at
eg
or
y
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
Le
ng
th
 o
f A
nn
ua
l
Le
ng
th
 o
f A
nn
ua
l
A
ve
ra
ge
 o
f c
ol
um
n 
E
A
ve
ra
ge
 le
ng
th
 o
f 
Ye
ar
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g
R
ep
or
t(p
ag
es
)
R
ep
or
t /
 a
ve
ra
ge
ac
ro
ss
 c
at
eg
or
y
an
nu
al
 r
ep
or
t f
or
St
an
da
rd
(s
)
le
ng
th
 fo
r 
ea
ch
 y
ea
r
al
l b
an
ks
1_market_risk  20/1/09  10:17  Página 30
31Market risk reporting by the world’s top banks
U
S 
B
an
kC
or
p
C
on
si
st
en
tly
 b
ad
20
00
U
S 
G
A
A
P
20
00
64
0.
39
0.
49
20
03
U
S 
G
A
A
P
20
03
12
7
0.
56
20
06
U
S 
G
A
A
P
20
06
13
0
0.
48
B
an
kO
ne
C
on
si
st
en
tly
 b
ad
20
00
U
S 
G
A
A
P
20
00
10
6
0.
64
20
03
U
S 
G
A
A
P
20
03
90
0.
40
20
06
M
er
ge
d 
w
ith
20
06
n/
a
JP
 M
or
ga
n 
C
ha
se
W
ac
ho
vi
a
Im
pr
ov
in
g 
st
ro
ng
ly
20
00
U
S 
G
A
A
P
20
00
11
6
0.
70
1.
11
20
03
U
S 
G
A
A
P
20
03
12
8
0.
57
20
06
U
S 
G
A
A
P
20
06
13
6
0.
50
U
ni
cr
ed
ito
 
Im
pr
ov
in
g 
st
ro
ng
ly
20
00
It
al
ia
n 
G
A
A
P
20
00
33
9
2.
05
It
al
ia
no
20
03
It
al
ia
n 
G
A
A
P
20
03
47
2
2.
09
20
06
IF
R
S
20
06
55
2
2.
04
R
oy
al
 B
an
k 
Im
pr
ov
in
g 
st
ro
ng
ly
20
00
C
an
ad
ia
n*
  
20
00
15
2
0.
92
of
 C
an
ad
a
20
03
C
an
ad
ia
n*
20
03
20
4
0.
90
20
06
C
an
ad
ia
n*
20
06
17
0
0.
63
So
ci
et
e 
G
en
er
al
e
Im
pr
ov
in
g 
st
ro
ng
ly
20
00
Fr
en
ch
 G
A
A
P 
20
00
93
0.
56
20
03
Fr
en
ch
 G
A
A
P
20
03
25
8
1.
14
20
06
IF
R
S
20
06
33
2
1.
23
TA
B
L
E
 6
 (
C
O
N
T
IN
U
A
T
IO
N
).
- 
D
IS
C
L
O
SU
R
E
 C
A
T
E
G
O
R
IE
S 
A
N
D
 A
N
N
U
A
L
 R
E
P
O
R
T
 L
E
N
G
T
H
B
an
k
C
at
eg
or
y
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
Le
ng
th
 o
f A
nn
ua
l
Le
ng
th
 o
f A
nn
ua
l
A
ve
ra
ge
 o
f c
ol
um
n 
E
A
ve
ra
ge
 le
ng
th
 o
f 
Ye
ar
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g
R
ep
or
t(p
ag
es
)
R
ep
or
t /
 a
ve
ra
ge
ac
ro
ss
 c
at
eg
or
y
an
nu
al
 r
ep
or
t f
or
St
an
da
rd
(s
)
le
ng
th
 fo
r 
ea
ch
 y
ea
r
al
l b
an
ks
1_market_risk  20/1/09  10:17  Página 31
32
Table 6 shows that neither of the main reporting regimes (US GAAP or IFRS) appear to
encourage consistency of disclosure levels.  For example, banks that report according to
US GAAP are classified as either having “consistently low”, “consistently high” or
“improving strongly” levels of disclosure. Similarly, banks using reporting practices based
upon IFRS (or the equivalent) appear in the “consistently high”, “consistently average”
and “improving strongly” categories. These findings suggest that institutional level
attitudes to voluntary reporting appear to outweigh the role played by regulations in
shaping patterns of disclosure (and resultant scores). Consequently, it is not possible to
generalize and argue that any single set of accounting regulations results in more extensive
levels of market risk reporting.  This does place some questions over the current global
convergence processes in accounting standards – particularly when the achievement of
greater comparability of disclosure is held out as one of the cornerstones of both the IASB’s
and the FASB’s conceptual frameworks.13
Table 6 also shows that the average length of the annual report of the sample banks is
increasing over time, from 166 pages in 2000 to 271 pages in 2006. The increased length
is driven by a mix of both more detailed regulatory reporting requirements, but also the
increased scope and encouragement of voluntary disclosures.  However, a longer report
does not necessarily imply more market risk disclosures. To test the relationship between
disclosure categories and the length of bank annual reports, a two stage calculation was
undertaken. The first stage compared the length of each bank’s annual report for a given
year against the average length of reports for that year. A value above one thus implies that
the bank’s report is longer than the average, and a fractional value implies a shorter than
average report. For example, Bank One’s report for 2003 scores just 0.4 indicating that it
is relatively short compared to the average, and perhaps not surprisingly the bank falls into
the “consistently low” category of disclosure. In the second stage, the ratio of the actual
report length to the average was calculated for each of the four categories (of disclosure
level).  The results obtained indicate that longer reports are associated with more extensive
levels of market risk disclosures. 
Banks with a consistently high level of market risk disclosures have a report length that is
on average 1.38 times the average for all of the banks. Conversely, the banks with a
consistently low level of disclosures have a report length just below half (0.49) the average
length. Reflecting this relationship between length and disclosure levels, banks with
strongly rising disclosure scores have an annual report length that is above-average. That
said, it is important to ask questions of the capacity of investors to make sense of and cope
with annual reports the length of, say, Unicredito Italiano – which stood at 552 pages in
M. Woods, K. Dowd and C. Humphrey
(13) For example, in July 2006 the IASB and FASB issued for comment a joint document on the proposed
content of a new, and common, conceptual framework. The document defines comparability as “the quality of
information that enables users to identify similarities in and differences between two sets of economic
phenomena” and declares it to be an important qualitative characteristic of financial reports on the grounds
that it “enhances the usefulness of financial reporting information in making investment, credit, and similar
resource allocation decisions” (FASB,2006, p.30).
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2006. This even exceeds the length of HSBC, whose reporting value (as noted earlier in
the presentation by Jon Moulton to the Treasury Select Committee) was questioned on the
grounds of weight by the English postal service!
Overall, therefore, our sample data provides some evidence of institutionally specific
biases in reporting practice. However, while individual banks may choose to make brief,
average, or extensive disclosures, the data does not allow us to identify the underlying
reasons for such choices. Emm (2007) et al. suggest that the nature and extent of an
institution’s market risk exposures, its need to protect proprietary information, and its
demand for capital market access are all relevant determinants of disclosure choices, but
these are not things that can be tested directly on the basis of the information made
available in published annual reports14.
International differences in disclosure practice
If we consider the banks by home country, we find that the banks in our sample fall
naturally into four different geographical groups.  Figure 1 shows, for each country
grouping, the range of disclosure scores for each year. Superimposed on these ranges is an
‘x’ mark which gives the mean disclosure score for the country grouping and year
concerned. The figure gives a sense of the disparities in scores and the mean scores for
each geographical grouping. 
Market risk reporting by the world’s top banks
(14) For example, we are unable to analyse robustly the relationship between market risk disclosures and
market risk exposure because VaR statistics are not comparable across institutions due to variations in
modelling methods. They also provide an incomplete picture of overall exposure. Additionally, annual reports
give no firm indication of each bank’s need to access the capital markets nor reveal the extent of the risk
information that it has chosen to regard as proprietary.
Each arrow gives the range of disclosure values for the geographical group of banks and year concerned. 
North America
FIGURE 1.- DISCLOSURE SCORES BY GEOGRAPHICAL GROUPING
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French, Italian and Spanish banks are characterised by generally low levels of disclosure
and high disparities between different banks’ disclosure practices. Although the mean
disclosure score for this geographical grouping in 2006 is virtually identical to that of
2003, the disclosure scores for 2006 span the full range from 0 to 41. This is a
consequence of the two outliers BNP Paribas (0) and Société Genéralé (41) upon which we
have already offered comment. It is very interesting to reflect, however, on the idea that
despite calls for harmonisation of international reporting practice, we can still find two
banks, falling under the same regulatory regimes both nationally and internationally,
which are still able to be so divergent in their disclosure practices. The case of BNP
Paribas also indicates that despite the fact that Pillar 3 of Basel had not taken effect in
2006, the bank was very far from complying with its spirit of making disclosures that are
consistent with how senior management and the board of directors assess and manage the
risks of the bank. 
By contrast, North American banks are characterised by a clearly rising trend in the mean
disclosure score, but a persistent and considerable degree of disparity in disclosure
practices. This confirms the findings of a 2002 transparency and disclosure survey of US
companies by Standard and Poor (Patel and Dallas, 2002). This survey focused on annual
report disclosures and found that companies exercised a high level of discretion in relation
to disclosures, with the result that there were notable differences in the standards across
different companies. Variations in transparency can be partially explained by the fact that
US companies can choose whether to disclose information in the annual report or to use
their regulatory filings as their main disclosure documents: some opt for one, and some opt
for the other. This makes life difficult for individual investors and analysts seeking to
compare risks across different banks, particularly given that the SEC filings (though
electronically accessible) are not presented in a style that is as “user friendly”.15
For their part, UK banks are characterised by high levels of disclosure, which are slightly
higher than the average disclosure level for North American banks but with a much lower
level of disparity. This is confirmed by Table 5 which shows that, with the exception of
Lloyds TSB, all of the other UK banks in the “Top 25” have disclosure scores in excess of
30 in 2006.
Finally, German, Dutch and Swiss banks are similar to the UK banks.  Disclosure levels
are high, except for the 2006 mean score which dips a little below its 2003 level. One
possible explanation for this is that, with the exception of Credit Suisse, all of the banks
in this group were from 2000 preparing accounts that included SEC 20K filings (and hence
reconciliations to US GAAP). Credit Suisse began doing the same thing in 2003. Detailed
M. Woods, K. Dowd and C. Humphrey
(15) It is also noticeable that some of the US banks appear to be less willing to disclose the more sensitive
information relating to market risk exposure and management. Such sensitive information might include items
such as histograms of trading revenue or profits, and back-testing information and results. This finding is also
in line with that of Perignon and Smith (2007).
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US qualitative and quantitative reporting requirements on market risk were introduced in
Financial Reporting Release No. 48 in 1997 and so foreign banks reporting in the USA
have had time to determine and refine practice in this area.16
Overall, the above data does point strongly to the conclusion that despite the promotion of
harmonisation post-2000, accounting practice in terms of market risk reporting still
exhibits significant diversity across geographic boundaries, and in some cases, within
geographic boundaries.  
CONCLUSIONS
The research analysis discussed above leads to four principal conclusions regarding the
level of market risk disclosures amongst the world’s largest banks. First, we find no strong
evidence of any relationship between levels of disclosure and company size, and we cannot
dismiss the hypothesis that these two variables are uncorrelated. Secondly, we find only
weak evidence of increasing disclosure over our sample period of 2000-2006. Third, there
is evidence that higher levels of disclosure are linked to longer annual reports. And,
fourthly, we demonstrate that despite the de jure shift towards harmonisation of accounting
practice, the de facto result is that international differences in disclosure practices remain
considerable. This latter point warrants detailed consideration.
Evidence from other surveys of financial reporting in banks both confirm the presence of
variations in risk disclosure practice and suggest that they remain ongoing, even after the
implementation of IFRS 7 in 2007. PwC’s survey of the 2007 financial reports of 22 global
banks, encompassing both IFRS and US GAAP preparers, found that risk information was
not positioned in consistent locations in annual reports, nor presented in an easily accessible
or usable way (PwC, 2008). Another report by KPMG on the 2007 annual reports of 17
European banks concluded that “despite detailed and extensive disclosures, the market risk
disclosures are not directly comparable between the banks” (KPMG, 2008, p.33). 
We would suggest that the ongoing lack of comparability in risk disclosure practice is a
result of the relative dominance of institutional-specific rather than regulatory influences
upon disclosure practice. In part, this may be a consequence of the form of international
regulatory disclosure requirements.  As the Deputy Director of the Bank of Italy observed,
the abstract and general principles of Basel 2 and IAS are hard to apply to concrete cases
(Ciocca, 2004). Our research very much suggests that the practical reality of accounting
disclosures is one where regulations are subordinate to the specifics of ‘concrete cases’. 
5
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(16) The fact that the disparity between the reporting of German, Dutch and Spanish banks is lower than that
for US banks does lend a sense of caution to such an explanation and is suggestive of other influential factors. 
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The IASB’s declared support for principles rather than rules based accounting standards
further reinforces the scope for institutional diversity in reporting practice. Schipper (2005)
recognises that the application of professional judgement implicit in the application of
principles-based standards does have implications for the comparability of IFRS reporting.
Principles-based standards mean that disclosures which extend beyond the minimal level
will be much more dependent on the reporting traditions of, and the particular circumstances
facing, individual banks when they prepare to issue their latest annual report. Furthermore,
direct reference to those traditions is encapsulated in the IASB’s encouragement of reporting
‘through the eyes of management.’  This stance is in direct contrast to the view that
investment analysis is based on comparative attributes. For instance, the US-based Centre
for Financial Market Integrity, in commenting to the IASB on its discussion paper on
Reducing Complexity in Reporting Financial Instruments, directly attributed the poor
comparability between firms to the IFRS 7 requirement of disclosure ‘through the eyes of
management’ and observed that “our experience is that voluntary disclosure requirements
result in boiler plate, meaningless information” (CFMI, 2008, p.9).
The lack of comparability and apparently limited usefulness of risk disclosures needs to
be seen against a background in which regulators continue to reiterate the importance of
a mutually understood commercial language and the value, among other things of the
world-wide adoption of IFRS:
“Ultimately, our capacity to live peaceably with each other depends upon our ability
to communicate intelligibly and reason coherently. In every case, to succeed, we need
to first construct a language of mutual understanding. Throughout the world, there is
no better opportunity to do this than through commerce. The fact that today over 100
nations are working on the introduction of IFRS and XBRL offers great hope that, in
markets at least, most of the world’s people may soon speak the same language. That
is progress we very badly need.” 
(International Business — An SEC Perspective”, Address to the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants’ International Issues Conference, by Christopher Cox,
SEC Chairman, January 10th, 2008) 
However, even people who speak the same language can say and do very different things!
The strong implication of our results is that we need to be spending much more time
looking at the detail of what people are doing (and saying about what they are doing) in
using existing and/or newly adopted (market risk reporting) languages.  This may seem a
cautious conclusion, particularly given the hopes that have been expressed for IFRS 7 in
terms of its anticipated capacity to improve the transparency of financial risk disclosures
and enable the market to assess more accurately the strength of an entity’s risk
management processes (for a typical example of such claims see http://www.fenews-
M. Woods, K. Dowd and C. Humphrey
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digital.com/fenews/20061112/?pg=34).  However, there are three particularly strong
grounds for maintaining a degree of scepticism over the future development of risk
reporting in the banking sector.  First, as our results have shown, the general adoption of
IFRS to date has not brought with it a substantial alignment in the risk reporting practices
of the world’s leading banks.  Indeed, there is an argument that the desire under IFRS not
to have specific risk reporting standards for banks has meant a real opportunity has been
missed for a significant strengthening in their market risk disclosures. Secondly, the PwC
(2008) and KPMG (2008) survey results suggest that it is ambitious to expect a new
standard such as IFRS 7 to diminish reporting diversity when it emphasises the
importance of allowing corporate management the discretion to report on risk in ways that
they deem appropriate.  Thirdly, with potentially competing demands for ‘additional’,
‘simpler’, ‘better’ and more ‘verifiable/auditable’ disclosures, there has to be doubt as to
whether bank risk reporting practices are likely to develop with any clear sense of
direction – which in turn places considerable questions marks over their likely use and
value to the readers of bank annual reports?  Indeed, from a research perspective, there
remains much to know in terms of what has driven and continues to drive bank risk
reporting practices and who makes use of such information.  
Such doubts and uncertainties over the value of risk disclosures, however, have not
quelled the calls from regulators, politicians and financial commentators around the world
for greater transparency in bank reporting. The European Central Bank (2006) in laying
down a range of criteria for assessing accounting standards from a financial stability
perspective stressed the role that enhanced financial disclosures could play in
strengthening market discipline and providing early warning signals on risk exposures.
Likewise, the Institute of International Finance (IIF, 2008) in its interim report of its
Committee on Market Best Practices has emphasised the critical importance, given current
banking business models, of high standards of risk management and reporting (para. 9)
and the need for more “useful disclosure” (para. 17).  The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2008), in summarising the work and recommendations of its Accounting Task
Force (ATF) and Risk Management and Modelling Group (RMMG), has likewise
emphasised the regulatory preference for more rigorous disclosure by banks.  Similarly,
leading politicians at the recent G20 summit agreed the need for fundamental reform of
the way the financial system is supervised, with new regulations to ensure greater
transparency and accountability. 
If the called for transparency – and comparability- of market risk disclosures is to be
achieved, however, then our research findings suggest that regulatory frameworks need to
be redrafted. Disclosures based upon the ‘eyes of management’ may not align with, and
inform the eyes of the market, and to the extent that they do not, then we have opacity not
transparency. Likewise, it is important to be aware of signs, especially in IFRS
implementation surveys, of a tick-box/check-list mentality that puts process ahead of the
Market risk reporting by the world’s top banks
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assessment of purpose and compliance over consideration of meaning and impact.  If
references to the importance of ‘principles’ needing to win out over ‘rules’ (and rules-based
systems) are to have substantive meaning, space has to be reserved for the questioning of
commitments to IFRS and knowing more specifically about what has been achieved in
terms of ‘enhanced’ reporting practice.  We would see this as an essential element of the
‘enlightened leadership’ called for in this arena by Zeff (2007).
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